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Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth
Circuit's Copyright Misuse Doctrine in Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds
For much of this century the United States Supreme Court has considered
the grant of a patent1 to be a public benefit that its owner may not misuse.
Doing so deprives the patentee of the right to enforce an infringement claim. 2 A
debate exists among lower federal courts and commentators, however, regarding
the type of conduct sufficiently abusive to constitute misuse. Must the patentee
use the patent to violate the antitrust laws? 3 Or must the patentee merely extend
the scope of the patent beyond the statute's permissible bounds, an act the courts
consider contrary to public policy?4 In like fashion, lower courts and commen-
1. A patent is a statutory grant that offers the patentee the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
his invention for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Under the Patent Act, the law considers the
patent to be personal property. Id. § 261. The grant of a patent primarily benefits society: by
offering the patentee a limited monopoly in exchange for an early disclosure of his invention, society
gains the benefit of knowledge that might otherwise be shrouded from view as a trade secret. See
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981); 8 E. LIPSCOMB, LIPSCOMB's
WALKER ON PATENTS § 28:2 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter WALKER ON PATENis]. For further con-
sideration of the patent law's procompetitive policy, see infra note 149.
Inventors seeking to patent their inventions must meet several statutory requirements. The
threshold requirement is that the invention be useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The patent laws also
require "novelty"-the inventor must be the first to invent or discover the device. Id. § 102(g). The
law charges the inventor with constructive knowledge of all prior references to relevant technologi-
cal developments. Id. § 102(a). If another discovery "anticipated" the invention, no patent will
issue. Thus, to be patentable the invention must be sufficiently new and different from what came
before it; or in the argot of the Patent Act, the invention must be "nonobvious." Id. § 103. The
Patent Office requires an applicant to demonstrate that her invention meets all requirements and
carefully scrutinizes each invention before issuing a patent. The Patent Act also establishes proce-
dures for the mediation of competing claims. See id. §§ 131-35, 141-46. For the statutory require-
ments for a valid copyright see infra note 6.
2. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,494(1942); Carbice Corp. v. Amedcan
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917).
3. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Since the
antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every practice that could impair competition substan-
tially, it is not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent an anticompetitive
practice-the abuse of a patent monopoly."); G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968,
970 (7th Cir. 1941) ("[A] patentee is not handicapped in his commercial transactions because he
owns a patent. What he could lawfully do before he acquired the patent, he may lawfully do after
acquirement."), rev'd, 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also 4 D. CHisUM, PATENTS § 19.04[2] (1990)
("mhe misuse doctrine presents greater analytical problems than antitrust analysis ... [which]
involves a balancing of patent interests and the impact or likely impact of a practice on competition.
The misuse doctrine compounds the difficulty of balancing by substituting for competitive injury the
vague notion of 'extension.' ").
The Patent Act recognizes patent misuse, but only a narrow field of patentee conduct rises to
the level of an antitrust violation to constitute misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988), quoted
infra at note 76. In the converse situation, where a patentee is charged with violating the antitrust
laws, the Patent Act states that nothing in the patent laws "shall be deemed to convey to any person
immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any defenses to actions, under any antitrust
law." Id. § 211.
4. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494; Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d
225, 231 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The policy underlying the misuse doctrine is designed to prevent a paten-
tee from projecting the economic effect of his admittedly valid grant beyond the limits of his legal
monopoly."); see Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 175, 178-
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tators5 have differed over whether these same principles should apply to another
limited monopoly, the copyright.6 The Supreme Court has implied that copy-
right misuse might be a valid defense,7 but it has not suggested what types of
misbehavior will bar an infringement claim.
In Lasercomb America, Ina v. Reynolds8 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court expressly to sanc-
tion copyright misuse as an infringement defense and to hold that such misuse
barred the plaintiff's action.9 The Fourth Circuit refused to import antitrust
requirements into the misuse doctrine; instead, the copyright holder's anticom-
petitive behavior towards a third party was deemed sufficiently contrary to pub-
92 (1988). One North Carolina jurist conjured up this colorful simile to describe patent misuse:
"Like Aesop's dog, he seeks to take in too much, and must lose what he already had." Dubuit v.
Harwell Enters., 336 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (McMillan, J.).
5. See, eg., Fine, Misuse and Antitrust Defenses to Copyright Infringement Actions, 17 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 315, 330-36 (1965); Gibbs, Copyright Misuse: Thirty Years Waiting for the Other Shoe, 23
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31, 37-57 (1977); Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1291, 1310-14 (1981).
6. Like patents, copyrights offer rewards to individuals as an inducement to generate an in-
creased number of unique expressions that benefit the general public. Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984). Despite the theoretical similarities, however, copyrights differ
in practical ways from patents.
A copyright is a limited monopoly granted to a work satisfying two criteria: The work must be
"original" in that it is the independent effort of the author seeking the copyright, and the work must
be fixed in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). For works created on or after January 1,
1978 the copyright endures for the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death. Id.
§ 302(a). The copyright grants certain exclusive rights in the protected work, including the right to
reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public (by sale, rental, lease,
or lending), and perform or display the work publicly. Id. § 106. Protection from unauthorized
copying extends only to the particular expressions originating with the author; it does not protect the
ideas that are part of the copyrighted work. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
There are two significant exceptions to a copyright grantee's claim of exclusivity. Unlike pat-
ents, the grantee need not be the first to create the unique expression. The alleged infringer's in-
dependent creation of an identical work is a defense to an infringement action. Mazer, 347 U.S. at
218. In addition, the Copyright Act provides that the unauthorized copying done pursuant to a "fair
use," typically for nonprofit educational purposes, is not an infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
No analogous provision exists in patent law.
Finally, the standards for securing a copyright are far less severe than are patent standards, and
copyrights are not subject to rigorous evaluations. For a useful comparison of the levels of protec-
tion afforded by patents and copyrights, see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99, 100-04 (2d Cir. 1951). See supra note 1 for a discussion of the practical and theoretical underpin-
nings of a patent.
7. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 6 & n.9 (1979). For a
discussion of CBS see infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
8. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). Lasercomb chose not to petition for certiorari because it felt
the added cost of litigation was not justified because "Interact," Lasercomb's copyrighted software
program, had become obsolete and because Lasercomb "purged" its misuse by discontinuing the use
of the noncompete clause in its standard licensing agreement. Telephone interview with Lee Brom-
berg, counsel for Lasercomb America, Inc. (Jan. 21, 1991). For a discussion of how a grantee may
purge its misuse see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
9. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. In 1948 one district court did deny the plaintiff-copyright
holder's action to enjoin infringement on the grounds that the plaintiff used its copyright to gain
monopolistic domination over musical compositions and therefore exceeded the privileges protected
under the copyright laws. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 849-50 (D. Minn. 1948),
appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1949). For a discussion of Jensen see infra notes 84-93 & 166-69 and accompanying texts.
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lic policy to deny relief.' 0
This Note traces the development of equitable defenses in the field of lim-
ited monopolies, from the origin of the "unclean hands" doctrine through the
parallel evolutions of patent and copyright misuse. It explores the underlying
policy justifications for granting limited monopolies and compares the varying
amounts of protection afforded to grantees. The Note examines the role that
antitrust principles have played in the misuse doctrine and concludes that the
Fourth Circuit incorrectly rejected those principles as a foundation for copyright
misuse. The Note maintains that the Fourth Circuit's embrace of the "public
policy" rationale creates a standard too ambiguous to guide those who seek to
exploit their property rights without losing the protection of the law.
Lasercomb America, Inc. created a computer software program called "In-
teract," which companies use to design and manufacture steel rule dies for the
paper box and carton industries.'1 Lasercomb also manufactures steel rule dies,
as did its competitor, Holiday Steel Rule Die Corporation. 12 In 1983, before it
was ready to put its software on the market, Lasercomb licensed four prerelease
copies of Interact to Holiday Steel under an oral agreement. 13 Each Interact
copy contained a "chronoguard," an antitheft device that allowed Interact to
work only on those machines to which it was attached. 14 Larry Holliday, Holi-
day Steel's president and sole shareholder, ordered his computer programmer,
Job Reynolds, to remove the chronoguards and to make three copies of Inter-
act. 15 Holiday Steel then began marketing a CAD/CAM program called PDS-
1000, which essentially was Interact under a new name. 16
Once Lasercomb discovered what Holiday Steel had done, it registered the
copyright 17 for Interact and sued for copyright infringement. 18 Defendants
10. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. For a discussion of violations of the antitrust laws, see infra
note 113.
11. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971. Companies use Interact for CAD/CAM (computer assisted
design and computer assisted manufacture). Id. at n.2. Interact permits a box designer to create a
"box blank"-a flat paperboard sheet that is cut so that it may be folded into a box, An Interact-
controlled computer stores information about the prototype box blank, and a die maker can use that
information to control the manufacture of a steel rule die. The die then stamps out quantities of box
blanks. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Lasercomb (No. 89-3245).
12. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971.
13. Although Lasercomb had asked Holiday Steel to sign its standard licensing agreement,
Holiday Steel never signed, and Lasercomb never demanded compliance. Id. at 973. Later, how-
ever, Holiday admitted in a letter that an oral agreement with Lasercomb bound Holiday Steel. Id.
at 973 n.7. Lasercomb charged Holiday Steel $35,000 for the first copy, $17,500 for the next two,
and $2,000 for the fourth copy. Id. at 971.
14. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 14, Lasercomb (No. 89-3245).
15. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971.
16. Id.
17. Registering the work with the Copyright Office is a prerequisite for filing an infringement
action. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). For works published before March 1, 1989 the author has five years
from the date of publication to register the work to preserve the copyright. Id. § 405(a). The
Copyright Act protects computer software as a "literary work," defined as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
Id. § 101. The Act limits the grantee's exclusive rights by permitting certain noninfringing uses.
For example, the owner of a copy of a computer program may make another copy freely, if the new
copy "is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine" or "is for archival purposes only." Id. § 117.
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Holiday Steel, Holiday, and Reynolds claimed that Lasercomb misused its
copyright because of anticompetitive clauses in Lasercomb's standard licensing
contract, clauses that restricted a licensee from creating its own computer-as-
sisted die-making software. 19 The district court rejected the copyright misuse
defense for three reasons. First, although another Interact licensee was bound
by the anticompetitive clauses, the defendants had not explicitly agreed to them,
and therefore had not suffered from the misuse.20 Second, the clause was " 'rea-
sonable in light of the delicate and sensitive area of computer software.' ",21 Fi-
nally, the court doubted whether such a defense existed as a matter of law.2 2
The trial court found the three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual
damages on both the copyright infringement and fraud claims, awarded punitive
damages against Holliday and Reynolds on the fraud claim, and permanently
enjoined all defendants from making or selling PDS-1000. 2 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
injunction and the damage award for copyright infringement, 24 affirmed the trial
court's finding of fraud,25 and remanded the case to the district court for recal-
culation of the damages.26 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
18. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972. Lasercomb also claimed breach of contract and fraud. Id.
The trial court dismissed Lasercomb's claims for misappropriation of trade secret, false designation
of origin, and unfair competition because the Copyright Act preempted them. Id.
19. Id. The clauses at issue in the Lasercomb licensing agreement read:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or suffer its
directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop, produce or
sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after the termi-
nation of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or assist others
in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die making software,
directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent. Any such activity
undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any warranties or agree-
ments of Lasercomb set forth herein.
Id. at 973. The term of the licensing agreement was for 99 years. Id.
20. Id. Holiday Steel never signed the standard licensing agreement but was bound under an
oral contract. See supra note 13.
21. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 (quoting the trial court's findings).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 972. The trial court found that "'the evidence at trial clearly disclosed not only
defendants' liability as copyright infringers, it also indicated their culpability... [as] malicious in-
fringers who acted with full knowledge of and gross disregard to plaintiff's right.'" Brief of Plain-
tiff-Appellee at 5-6 (quoting trial court's findings) (emphasis in Brief). Following the judgment
against it, Holiday Steel went bankrupt and the bankrupt estate stipulated it would not appeal. Id.
at 3 n.2.
24. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
25. Id. at 980.
26. Id. The trial court found that Lasercomb had suffered damages of $105,000 from the in-
fringement and another $105,000 from the fraud. The damages arose, however, from lost sales of the
same copies of Interact; Lasercomb, therefore, could not recover twice. Id. at 972 n.3. The court
based the $105,000 damages amount on Interact's sale price of $35,000 to first-time buyers, multi-
plied by three---the number of unauthorized copies defendants made of Interact. Id. at 980. The
Fourth Circuit, in contrast, noted that it could only measure damages by lost sales to Holiday Steel,
which was receiving a discount for additional purchases of Interact. Id. at 981. It was up to the
district court on remand to decide whether the defendants' fraudulent activities induced Lasercomb
to discount its price. Id.
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the copyright misuse defense was far from being a settled area of the law,27 but
considered the defense to be "inherent in the law of copyright." 28
The touchstone of the court's analysis was the body of patent law that pro-
duced the patent misuse defense and the parallel public policies behind patent
and copyright law. After discussing the seventeenth century English Crown's
practice of granting limited monopolies, 29 the court found that the Federal Con-
stitution's grouping of patent and copyright into the same clause reflected "a
unitary purpose-to promote progress."'30 The court then examined a seminal
patent misuse case, Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 31 and found that its
"phraseology adapts easily to the copyright context."' 32 The result of that easy
adaptation is that public policy excludes from protection all that is not embraced
by the copyright and forbids the use of a copyright to secure rights not granted
by the Copyright Office.
33
The Lasercomb panel next considered whether copyright misuse depends
on antitrust principles. The trial court deemed Lasercomb's noncompete clause
to be "reasonable," a notion that the Fourth Circuit assumed was derived from
the antitrust concept of the "rule of reason."' 34 While stating that an antitrust
27. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's discomfort with the apparent lack of certainty
surrounding the copyright misuse doctrine, see infra note 144.
28. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
29. Id. at 974.
30. Id. at 975. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
The Supreme Court has noted the "historic kinship between patent law and copyright law," but
also has warned that "[t]he two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise
the caution which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the
other." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 & n.19. (1984). Despite that
warning, however, the Court in Sony Corp. readily applied the doctrine of contributory infringement
to copyrights. The Court noted that the Patent Act expressly defines this concept but the Copyright
Act does not. Id. at 434-35. Such a doctrine, the Court concluded, was necessary to provide "effec-
tive ... protection of the statutory monopoly" when a defendant sells copying equipment that is
capable only of substantial infringing uses. Id. at 442. The Court found that, although the general
public was using video recorders sold by Sony to tape the plaintiffs' copyrighted motion pictures,
Sony was not liable for contributory infringement because its video recorders were also capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. Id. at 456.
31. 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The Fourth Circuit noted that although Morton Salt was not the first
Supreme Court case to recognize the patent misuse defense, it is generally considered the "founda-
tional" case. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. For a discussion of Morton Salt, see infra notes 49-68 and
accompanying text.
32. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. The Fourth Circuit quoted a passage from Morton Salt and
replaced patent terms and phrases with those applicable to copyright. The Fourth Circuit thus
found:
"The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright] carries out a public
policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors]... the exclusive
Right.. . ' to their ["original" works]. United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, [17
U.S.C.A. § 102]. But the public policy which includes [original works] within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the [original expression]. It equally
forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant."
Id. (quoting Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492) (bracketed material added by the Lasercomb court).
33. Id. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the rights protected under the copyright laws.
34. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. Although the Sherman Act forbids "every contract ... in
restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), courts interpret this language to mean that only those
[Vol. 691676
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violation would trigger the copyright misuse defense, the Fourth Circuit held
that an antitrust violation is not a prerequisite to barring an infringement action.
Instead, any attempt to use a copyright "to control competition in an area
outside the copyright, Le. the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture," would
give rise to misuse "regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust
violation."135 The Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion because Morton Salt did
not require an antitrust violation to apply the patent misuse defense.36 In re-
jecting the copyright misuse defense, the district court had emphasized that the
defendants had not explicitly agreed to the noncompete clause, and therefore
could not claim injury from the alleged misuse in order to bar the infringement
action against them.37 The Fourth Circuit, however, relied on the venerable
Morton Salt decision to conclude that the copyright misuse defense is applicable
even though the infringing parties did not themselves suffer injuries from the
misuse.38
Copyright misuse cases such as Lasercomb are the culmination of complex,
intertwined conceptions of unclean hands, rights under the patent and copyright
laws, and antitrust principles. Some cases rest the copyright misuse defense
solely on antitrust principles,39 while others deny that an antitrust violation can
provide an affirmative defense to infringement. 4° Still others, like Lasercomb,
find that an antitrust violation, while not a prerequisite, may trigger a misuse
contracts that unreasonably restain trade are illegal. W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTrrRUST LAW § 5.01[2] (1990). See infra note 113 for a discussion of the antitrust rule of reason.
For a discussion of the noncompete clause's purported reasonableness, see infra note 175.
35. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. The Lasercomb panel described the noncompete clause as
containing language that was "extremely broad," and found it to be "at least as egregious" as similar
language in a patent licensing agreement that the Fourth Circuit had declared to be a patent misuse.
Id. at 978-79 (citing Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38,45 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 968 (1972)). For a discussion of Compton and other cases involving noncompete clauses, see
infra note 175.
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the noncompete clause constituted copyright misuse, it
rejected the defendants' claim that Lasercomb created an illegal "tying" arrangement by discounting
Interact's price for those licensees who also purchased steel rule dies from Lasercomb. Lasercomb,
911 F.2d at 972 n.6. Because Lasercomb did not require a buyer to purchase Interact or steel rule
dies when buying the other product, or require its customers to agree not to purchase goods from
other sellers, the court found no tie-in. Id. A tying arrangement is one in which a seller requires
that a purchaser buy one item (the tied product) to buy another (the tying product). See Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 & n.4 (1958).
36. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. For a discussion of the unified economic theory behind patent
and antitrust law, see infra note 149.
37. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
38. Id.
39. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987);
see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (balancing the
equities between harm caused by copyright owner's alleged antitrust violation and infringer's
culpability).
40. See, eg., BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing,
Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (denying antitrust defense to copyright infringement
but recognizing misuse defense when there is an attempt to extend the limited monopoly beyond the
protected work); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan.
1987); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F_ Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Grant's Cabin, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633, 634-45 (E.D. Mo. 1979); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 480 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir.
1924).
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defense.4 1
The animating principle behind denying relief from infringement is equita-
ble in nature; a court will not render assistance to a party coming into court with
unclean hands.42 The unclean hands doctrine bars legal or equitable relief to a
plaintiff who has harmed the defendant in a way that bears directly on the mat-
ter in controversy.4 3 In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.44 the
Supreme Court denied relief in a patent infringement case because the patentee,
in an earlier case, had suppressed evidence that would have shown his patent to
be invalid.45 The Court stated that for the doctrine to apply there must be an
immediate and necessary relationship between the plaintiff's unconscionable act
and the relief sought.46 Courts have also applied the unclean hands doctrine in
copyright infringement actions. One early court, for example, applied the doc-
trine when the copyright holder's advertisements were false and misleading,
thereby causing a public injury egregious enough to bar relief.47 Subsequent
copyright cases disavowed this broad application and confined the equitable de-
fense to "misuses that frustrate the particular purposes of the copyright...
statute."
'48
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. the Supreme Court modified the
unclean hands doctrine, permitting a patent infringer to assert the patent misuse
defense even though the patentee's misuse did not harm the infringer. 49 The
Court previously had recognized the patent misuse defense only when the in-
fringing party suffered injury by the patentee's attempt to enlarge the scope of
41. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 487, 488 (D. Del. 1978); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn.
1948) ("One who unlawfully exceeds his copyright monopoly and violates anti-trust laws is not
outside the pale of the law, but where the Court's aid is requested ... it should be denied."), appeal
dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
42. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979);
Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 850.
43. MitchellBros., 604 F.2d at 863; see also Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507 n.8
(4th Cir. 1969) (equitable estoppel barring plaintiff the right to plead copyright infringement applica-
ble both in law and equity); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1137
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (unclean hands applies in equity suits as well as in actions for damages), rev'd on
other grounds, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
45. Id. at 246-47.
46. Id. at 245.
47. Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837, 841-43 (5th Cir. 1915).
48. See, eg., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 864 (5th Cir.
1979). The Fifth Circuit, largely repudiating its earlier decision in Stone & McCarrick, refused to
permit the defendant to assert a "public injury" defense based on the claim that the infringed work
was obscene. Id. at 865. In limiting Stone & McCarrick, the Fifth Circuit contrasted that case with
Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), finding that Morton Salt properly required
clean hands when the patentee subverted the public policy behind the patent statute. Id. at 864.
It is interesting to note, however, that Morton Salt itself relied on Stone & McCarrick to deny
the patentee's infringement claim. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494. Seemingly unconcerned about the
prior requirement that there be an "immediate and necessary" relationship, the Court in Morton Salt
justified barring the patentee's claim, even though the infringer had not suffered from the patent
misuse, because of "the adverse effect upon the public interest." Id. (emphasis added). For a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's departure from traditional equitable doctrine when confronted with
enforcing patent claims, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
49. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
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the patent privileges. 50 In Morton Salt the plaintiff owned the patent for a can-
ning industry device that inserted measured amounts of salt in tablet form into
canned goods.5 1 The plaintiff leased its machines but required that licensees
purchase salt tablets exclusively from the plaintiff's subsidiary. 52 The Court de-
nied injunctive relief from the defendant's patent infringement on the grounds
that the patentee was using its patent to restrain competition in the market for
salt tablets, an unpatented item, and that continued restraint would permit the
patentee to create a limited monopoly not within the scope of the patent grant.53
Although the infringer also competed with the patentee in the salt tablet
market,5 4 the Court considered injury to the public to be of primary impor-
tance.55 The Court recognized that the unclean hands doctrine typically bal-
ances the relative misconduct of the parties to the suit, but found that
"additional considerations must be taken into account where maintenance of the
suit concerns the public interest as well as the private interests of suitors."15 6
Because the patentee derives privileges from a statutory grant enacted to further
a public policy, the Court would not protect a patent being used to subvert that
policy.57 The policy has two components: protecting inventions included in the
patent while excluding from the patent all that is not embraced by the inven-
tion,5 8 and forbidding a patentee from using its patent to secure an exclusive
privilege that the Patent Office did not grant.5 9 To the Court, a successful in-
fringement claim would adversely affect the public interest. 6° That adverse im-
pact, in combination with the misuse, disqualified the patentee from protection
regardless of whether the infringer suffered from the patent misuse.6 1
However harsh the patent misuse doctrine may appear, the Court noted
that the misuse could be "purged" by abandoning the improper conduct and
dissipating the harmful consequences of the misuse.62 The patent misuse doc-
50. See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31-35 (1931) (plaintiff-
patentee denied relief against supplier who sold dry ice to plaintiff's licensees with the knowledge
that the license required dry ice to be purchased only from patentee); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917) (owner of a patented film projector barred
from enforcing license restriction against film distributors when patent license required that only
films rented from the patentee's licensee could be used with the patented projector).
51. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 489.
52. Id. at 490-91.
53. Id. at 491.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 493.
56. Id. The Supreme Court later rationalized this change from the traditional unclean hands
doctrine through the fiction of joining the public as a party to the suit. Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). Because of the "far-reaching
social and economic consequences of a patent," the public has a "paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope." Id.
57. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
58. Id. at 492.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 494.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 493. See generally 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.04[4] (discussion of purging
and dissipating'patent misuse).
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trine therefore does not invalidate a patent; the patentee may bring an action for
an infringement occurring after the misuse is satisfactorily purged. 63 In fact, a
patentee may purge the misuse even after commencing the infringement claim. 64
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
the Morton Salt Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the patentee's
tying arrangement65 violated antitrust laws under the Clayton Act.66 In the
Seventh Circuit's view, acquiring a patent does not impose a higher standard of
commercial behavior on patentees because the antitrust laws were not designed
to "discriminate between patentees and others when it comes to use or sale of
unpatented articles." 67 The Supreme Court, however, found that an inquiry
into whether the patentee substantially decreased competition or tended to cre-
ate a monopoly missed the point. Although the patent misuse doctrine is con-
cerned with a patentee's anticompetitive conduct, the proper analysis must be
grounded in the patent laws and the public policy behind them.6 8
Morton Salt did not predicate patent misuse on antitrust principles; instead,
the Court intimated that antitrust violations may serve as the basis for patent
misuse.69 Subsequently, however, the Court and commentators70 have muddied
the distinction by linking the two concepts. In Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. 7 1 the Court opined that "[t]he legality of any attempt
63. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 419-20 (1945); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prod. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1950); see also WALKER ON PATENTS,
supra note 1, § 28:35 ("[I]mproper use does not invest an infringer with a license for the life of the
patent, for if a patent owner purges himself of the improper business practices, he may then enforce
his patent and recover damages for infringement occurring thereafter.").
64. See Westinghouse Elea, 179 F.2d at 145 ("Since plaintiff here has abandoned any illegal
conduct, it is entitled to the protection of the courts and there is no reason why relief should not be
afforded in the presently pending litigation.").
65. See supra note 35 for a definition of a tying arrangement. For a discussion of congressional
reform of patent misuse based on tying clauses, see infra note 76.
66. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494. Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that:
lit shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce... to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods... whether patented or unpatented ... or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods... or
other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect
... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (emphasis added).
67. G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 314 U.S.
458 (1942).
68. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
69. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) ('iSlo long as the
patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he cannot restrain infringement of
it by others."). Indeed, Judge Posner has repeatedly argued that an antitrust violation must be the
basis for patent or copyright misuse. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816
F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (copyright misuse); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d
505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (patent misuse). See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for a
discussion of antitrust and nonantitrust violations constituting patent misuse.
70. See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09[A] (1989)
(describing patent cases like Morton Salt and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), as holding that "a patentee who uses his patent privilege contrary to the
public interest by violating the antitrust laws will be denied the relief of a court of equity in a patent
infringement action.").
71. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the
anti-trust laws not by the patent law.... [T]he effort here made to control
competition in this unpatented device plainly violates the anti-trust laws." '72
This holding may be interpreted as requiring an antitrust violation as a predicate
for patent misuse, but it may be viewed also as a call to permit a patent misuse to
be a per se violation of the antitrust laws, without requiring an inquiry into the
patentee's market power.73 Although the Supreme Court implicitly has rejected
this concept 74 and reaffirmed its allegiance to Morton Salt's patent misuse doc-
trine,75 Congress has recently circumscribed the limits of the patent misuse de-
fense by explicitly requiring courts to employ antitrust principles when the
claimed misconduct involves tying arrangements and package licensing.7 6 The
interplay and tension between limited monopolies and antitrust doctrines is re-
72. Id. at 684. In a companion case, the Court again noted that "the anti-trust acts or other
laws not the patent statutes define the public policy." Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 666.
73. Calkins, supra note 4, at 184-85. Market power is a critical component of an antitrust
inquiry. If the purported anticompetitive conduct involves a tying arrangement, the court must
evaluate whether the defendant-seller
has the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require pur-
chasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive
market. In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product.
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (citation omitted).
74. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) ("lit does not
necessarily follow that the [patent] misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2
of the Sherman Act, or that a violation threatened Zenith so as to entitle it to an injunction under
§ 16 of the Clayton Act.").
75. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (Without importing
antitrust principles into patent doctrine, the Court noted that "Et]he policy of free competition runs
deep in our law. It underlies both the doctrine of patent misuse and the general principle that the
boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the literal scope of the patent claims.").
76. Package licensing may or may not constitute misuse. Two types of package licenses are
permissible. One type is when patents "block" each other so that the patents may not be exploited
without each infringing the other. A second type is when the patents are "complementary"-i.e.,
each patent protects a discreet unit within a larger device, making it inefficient, if not impossible, to
produce the device without the complementary patents. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, at § 22.02.
Package licensing may become an illegal tying arrangement when a patentee requires the licensee to
take a license on one patent as a condition for the grant of a license on another. See Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 830-31 (1952). The 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-73, tit. II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988), amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) to
read:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of having done one or more of the following: ... (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
Although the Lasercomb panel remarked on this change in patent misuse doctrine, Lasercomb,
911 F.2d at 976 & n.15, the court failed to take notice of the strong congressional effort to predicate
patent misuse doctrine entirely on antitrust principles in accordance with the view espoused by
Judge Posner. See Calkins, supra note 4, at 192-200. Although Congress ultimately did not adopt
such a radical departure from existing patent misuse doctrine, Senate leaders gave notice that Con-
gress intends to make more extensive changes in the future. Id. at 197-200. Under existing federal
trademark law, the trademark owner's present or past use of the trademark to violate the antitrust
laws is a defense to an infringement action. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1988).
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flected by the broad scope of what may constitute patent misuse,77 including
agreements not to deal in competing goods,78 royalties based on total sales,79
price fixing,80 tying arrangements, 81 package licensing, 82 and field-of-use
restrictions.8 3
The admixture of antitrust standards and policy-based misuse doctrine fre-
quently spills over into the area of copyright law. The Supreme Court has never
expressly declared the copyright misuse defense to be legitimate. This failure
may explain why the lower courts, with one exception prior to Lasercomb, have
not rushed to transplant Morton Salt's misuse defense into copyright doctrine.
In M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen 84 a Federal district court, relying on Mor-
ton Salt, denied injunctive relief because of the copyright owners' anticompeti-
tive conduct.85 The Jensen plaintiffs owned copyrighted musical works and
belonged to the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP).8 6 Through ASCAP the plaintiffs licensed to motion picture producers
"synchronization rights"-the right to record plaintiffs' musical compositions
onto the soundtracks of certain motion pictures.87 The plaintiffs' licensing
agreement did not include the right to perform publicly the compositions. The
plaintiffs claimed that defendant motion picture theater operators infringed by
showing films containing the copyrighted musical works without first obtaining
a license to perform the music.8 8 Although theater operators may bargain with
individual copyright owners for a performance license, for practical reasons they
have no real choice but to take a "blanket license" through a performance soci-
77. See Calkins, supra note 4, at 187 n.38 (for a discussion of various patent misuses). See
generally 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.04[3][a]-1] (comprehensive discussion of various patent
misuses).
78. Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 44-45 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 968
(1972), cited in Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979; Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d
782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1964); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256
(3d Cir. 1943). Courts uniformly have found noncompete clauses in patent licenses to be a per se
misuse of the patent. See 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, at § 19.04[3][b] (citing cases). For a discussion
of noncompete clauses as the measure for misuse, see infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
79. Although coercing a licensee to pay royalties based on total sales constitutes misuse, Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138 (1969), the patentee and its licensee may
agree to the arrangement if it is convenient for the parties to collect royalties in such a way. Auto.
matic Radio, 339 U.S. at 834.
80. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952); United States v. Line Mate-
rial Co., 333 U.S. 287, 306 (1948).
81. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Under the 1988 Patent Reform
Act, tying arrangements must be analyzed under antitrust standards to constitute patent misuse. See
supra note 76 for the language of the statute.
82. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 830-31; see supra note 76 for a definition of package licensing.
83. A patentee may restrict a licensee to make or use the patent only in a particular field.
WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 1, § 28:17. It is patent misuse, however, to demand such a re-
striction after the first sale. General Talking Picture Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-
82, aff'd on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
84. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger
Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
85. Id. at 850. Later, the Fourth Circuit cited Jensen as the only "case which has actually
applied copyright misuse to bar an action for infringement." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.





ety like ASCAP. 89
The Jensen court agreed with defendants that the consequence of ASCAP's
licensing practices created the economic power to coerce theater owners into
taking blanket performance licenses, giving the plaintiffs advantages far greater
than those enjoyed by a single copyright owner.90 Although the court found that
the copyright owners violated the antitrust laws,9 1 it was more concerned with
the practice of using a copyright to expand illegitimately the rights granted
under the copyright laws to the detriment of the public interest. 92 The court
concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether antitrust violations alone
would constitute copyright misuse barring the plaintiffs' infringement claim.
93
The law of antitrust-based copyright misuse is much more developed,
although highly fractured. 94 Due to mixed signals from the Supreme Court, two
mutually exclusive doctrines have evolved. One doctrine permits an antitrust-
based copyright misuse defense as a result of the Court's linking antitrust viola-
tions to the improper enlargement of the copyright monopoly. 95 The other for-
bids that type of copyright misuse defense because of the Court's prohibition
against "collateral" antitrust defenses. 96
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc 97 the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized the copyright misuse defense and hinted that antitrust analysis ought
to play a role in considering whether a grantee has misused its copyright. The
Court found that defendant motion picture distributors' practice of "block-
booking"9 8 violated the antitrust laws.99 In citing Morton Salt, however, the
court also remarked that the practice improperly enlarged what the copyright
89. Rather than deal with multitudes of copyright owners, the blanket licensee pays an annual
fee to ASCAP and in exchange receives the right to perform all the musical works authorized to
ASCAP, regardless of whether the licensee needs or desires all the works in the ASCAP catalogue.
Id. at 845. When the performance licensee pays ASCAP, that association distributes the royalties to
ASCAP members based upon a formula it has devised. Id. at 846.
90. Id. at 847. The court noted that the licensing scheme gave ASCAP members a monopoly of
"80% of all of the music recorded in motion picture films." Id.
91. Id. at 850.
92. Id.
93. Id. A more recent case, however, cites Jensen as supporting a copyright misuse defense
due to practices violating the antitrust laws. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 487, 488 (D. Del. 1978).
94. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320,
328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing copyright misuse defense as "ill-received" by lower courts, typically
either rejected out of hand, or if recognized, finding misuse defense inapplicable on the facts).
95. See infira notes 97-123 and accompanying text.
96. An antitrust violation may be collateral when the contract in restraint of trade is not the
subject matter of the suit. Defendants have asserted, without much success, that the courts should
not permit a plaintiff in violation of the antitrust laws to enforce a claim for breach of contract, even
though the disputed contract did not form the basis for the antitrust violation. See, eg., Kelly v.
Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518-21 (1959). For a discussion of the judicial treatment given to collateral
antitrust defenses, see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
97. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
98. Block-booking is a motion picture tying arrangement in which distributors license films "on
condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released by the
distributors during a given period." Id. at 156.
99. Id. at 159.
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granted.100
In United States v. Loew's, Inc. 101 the Supreme Court again addressed the
practice of block-booking films, but this time to television stations rather than
movie theaters. The Court found that the practice violated section 1 of the Sher-
man Act,10 2 and that for tying arrangements the law requires that the seller have
"'sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.' "103 The Court
rejected defendants' attempt to distinguish Paramount Pictures on the grounds
that, because television stations rely on films only for a small fraction of their
programming, the defendants lacked sufficient economic power. 104 The Court
responded that when the tying product is patented or copyrighted the "requisite
economic power is presumed." 105 Therefore, the court held that compelling a
licensee to take unwanted films as a condition for the desired license is illegal,
and the copyright monopoly must be strictly confined by the antitrust laws. 10 6
Because the case involved a government suit brought under the antitrust laws,
rather than a claim for copyright infringement, the Court did not need to decide
whether a copyright misuse defense existed. The Court's specific reference to
the patent misuse defense, however, in conjunction with its uniform application
of the antitrust laws to both patents and copyrights, 10 7 suggests that the Loew's
Court tacitly approved of a copyright misuse defense. 10 8
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 1o9 the Supreme
Court gave the lower courts further reason to believe that antitrust violations
can trigger the copyright misuse defense. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
100. Id. at 157. By forcing a licensee to take an inferior copyrighted work as a condition to
receiving a superior one, the licensor "strengthens its monopoly" beyond what the copyright in-
tended and reaps disproportionate rewards. Id. at 158.
101. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
102. Id. at 39. The Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Although the statute prohibits
"every contract," courts construe this language narrowly by forbidding only those contracts that
unreasonably restrain trade. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 5.0112]. For a discussion of the various
judicial modes of antitrust analysis, see infra note 113.
103. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
104. Id. at 47-48.
105. Id. at 48. Prior to the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, see supra note 76, several appellate
courts rejected, either expressly or implicitly, the presumptive economic power of patented or copy-
righted works used in tying arrangements. The courts instead inquired into the grantee's actual
market power in the patented or copyrighted product. See Nobel Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Beelman
Instruments, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1313, 1328 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1987)
(patents); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1987) (case in-
volving copyrighted computer software in which Sixth Circuit observed that " '[m]ore often than not
... a patent or copyright provides little, if any, market power.' " (quoting Note, The Presumption of
Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1140, 1156 (1985))).
106. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49.
107. Id. at 46-49. The Loew's Court noted that "[a]ccommodation between the statutorily dis-
pensed monopoly in the combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted product and the
statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the patent or copyright monopoly
by the use of tying agreements be strictly confined." Id. at 49.
108. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 70, § 13.09[A].
109. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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sued Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and ASCAP claiming that the performance
societies' blanket licensing of copyrighted musical works amounted to price fix-
ing and was per se illegal under the antitrust laws. 10 CBS also asked for a
declaratory judgment that BMI and ASCAP were misusing their copyright. 11'
The Court reversed both the Second Circuit's finding that the blanket li-
censing was illegal per se under the antitrust laws and the copyright misuse
judgment that the trial court had predicated on an antitrust violation.' 12 The
Court remanded to the lower court for an assessment of the claim under the
antitrust rule of reason.' 13 Writing for the Court, Justice White stated:
Although the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to
fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws,
we would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 14
The implication, therefore, is quite strong that the Court not only recog-
nized that the copyright misuse defense exists, but that the antitrust laws are the
proper measurement of copyright misuse. 1 5 This implied approval, in both
110. Id. at 6.
111. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
112. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
113. Id. at 24-25. Under the rule of reason an agreement unreasonably restrains trade if, under
all the facts and circumstances, its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects. See
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); J. VAN CISE, W.
LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 35 (9th ed. 1986). This factual
inquiry has its limits in that "the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in
favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly
on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
688.
Agreements that are illegal per se are those "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality." Id. at
692. The law has deemed certain practices facially anticompetitive: price fixing, tying arrange-
ments, agreements between competitors to divide markets, boycotts, pooling profits, and bans on
competitive bidding. . VAN CiSE, W. LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, supra, at 116. Before courts will find
that the challenged trade practice is presumptively illegal, the courts require proof that the practice
creates adverse economic effects in light of judicial experience that "the practice is of a type that will
'always or almost always tend to restrict competition.'" W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 5.01[2]
(quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20).
A defendant may rebut the presumption of illegality by two methods: (1) Showing that the
restraint is essential to allow the product to become available; if so, then the restraint is scrutinized
under the rule of reason and will be upheld if the restraint's potential for anticompetitive effects is
never realized and the purpose for the restraint is lawful; (2) If the restraint does not involve price,
the restraining party does not have market power, and the restraint is "reasonably ancillary to effi-
ciency in competition." 3. VAN CisE, W. LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, supra, at 118-19.
114. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19 (emphasis in original).
115. Several commentators support this view. See, eg., W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 4.09;
Comment, Copyright Misuse and Cable Television: Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 35
FED. COMM. L.J. 347, 360 (1980) ("Tlhe Court agreed that the limits of the copyright grant are
defined by the antitrust laws."); Note, supra note 5, at 1305; Note, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc.: The Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 15 NEW. ENG. L.J. 683, 693 (1980)
("[Tlhe Court appears to be endorsing a copyright misuse doctrine which is analogous to the patent
misuse doctrine and requires no analysis of copyright policy.").
This viewpoint is not universally shared. See, eg., Phelan, The Continuing Battle with the Per-
forming Rights Societiev The Per Se Rule, the Rule of Reason Standard and Copyright Misuse, 15
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Broadcast Music and Loew's, has influenced several lower courts in their finding
of copyright misuse predicated on antitrust illegality. 116
The Seventh Circuit, and Judge Posner in particular, has accepted the
Supreme Court's apparent invitation to permit a copyright misuse defense, but
only if predicated exclusively on antitrust violations. In Saturday Evening Post
Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc. 117 the plaintiff-licensor sued its licensee for breach
of the copyright licensing agreement. The agreement contained a clause stating
that the licensee would not dispute the validity of any copyrights the licensor
may have obtained. 118 The licensee argued that the no-contest clause violated
the public policy of the Copyright Act and therefore was unenforceable. 119 The
Seventh Circuit responded that no-contest clauses in copyright licenses are valid
unless they violate the antitrust laws. 120 The court cited a previous Seventh
Circuit patent misuse opinion for its reasoning:
"If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles,
by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alterna-
tive concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to
try to develop one without in the process subjecting patent holders to
debilitating uncertainty."' 12 1
The court stated that this reasoning was even more persuasive regarding
TEx. TECH. L. REv. 349, 377 (1984) ("Mhe Supreme Court did not expressly rule that a finding of
copyright misuse is always dependent upon an antitrust violation."). Similarly the Lasercomb panel
rejected the idea that Broadcast Music mandates an antitrust-based misuse defense, stating that
viewed "[i]n context ... it is apparent that misuse was linked to antitrust in that case simply as a
matter of litigation strategy. Copyright misuse was not asserted as a defense to an infringement suit,
and the primary claim was an antitrust claim." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977 n.17.
116. See United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 612 (8th Cir. 1988) (recogniz-
ing the concept of antitrust-based copyright misuse, but finding no antitrust violation in this case);
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a no-contest clause in a copyright licensing agreement is valid unless violative of antitrust law);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs,, 746 F. Supp. 320, 327:28
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that an affirmative defense of copyright misuse is cognizable following
a finding that defendant pleaded a colorable monopolization counterclaim); F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (tying arrangement held to be a
per se Sherman Act violation and therefore a misuse of plaintiff's copyright), rev'd, 214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 409, 413 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) (reversing the district court's finding of a per se Sherman Act
violation, but noting that copyright misuse is an equitable defense that requires a balancing of equi-
ties); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357, 364-65 (D. Del. 1980) (denying
plaintiff-copyright holder's motion for summary judgment against allegedly infringing defendant's
copyright misuse defense and antitrust counterclaim on grounds that a factual question existed
whether plaintiff's conduct violated antitrust rule of reason); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 280, 287 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (plaintiff's antitrust violations
constituted copyright misuse, rendering copyright unenforceable), rev'd, 497 F.2d 285, 290 (10th
Cir. 1974) (assuming that antitrust violations are copyright misuse, no basis to support finding of
antitrust violations), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
117. 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff magazine licensed to the defendant the right to
manufacture porcelain dolls based on Norman Rockwell illustrations. Id. at 1193. Although the
license warranted that the Saturday Evening Post owned the copyright in the Rockwell illustrations,
it bad a copyright only in each of the magazines and not in the illustrations themselves. Id. After
the license terminated the defendant continued making the dolls, precipitating the litigation. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1199.
120. Id. at 1200.




copyright misuse because copyrights present a smaller threat of monopolization
than do patents. 122 The court observed that if a copyright holder seeks to ex-
tend its monopoly power beyond that granted by the statute, the proper avenue
of attack is under the Sherman Act, rather than "a federal common law rule that
would jostle uncomfortably with the Sherman Act." 123
In marked contrast to this strain of legal thought that demands an anti-
trust-based misuse defense is a line of cases that rejects the idea that antitrust
violations can preclude enforcement of a copyright infringement claim. This
judicial hostility borrows from a long-held doctrine that an antitrust violation is
not a defense to a breach of contract. 124 Beginning in the early part of this
century, the Supreme Court distinguished between contracts that are inherently
illegal under the antitrust laws and contracts that are merely collateral to the
alleged illegality. 125 When the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract, the Court
repeatedly ruled that the plaintiff's violation of the antitrust laws is not a defense
if the contract itself is not inherently illegal under the antitrust laws. 12 6
For example, in Bruce's Juices, Ina v. American Can Co. 127 the plaintiff
sought to collect on promissory notes the defendant had signed following
purchases of goods from the plaintiff.128 The defendant asserted that the notes
were uncollectible because the plaintiff's pricing policy for other buyers was iMle-
gally discriminatory under the Robinson-Patman Act. 129 The Court rejected
this antitrust defense because the contract was not inherently illegal' 30 and be-
cause voiding contracts was not among the Act's exclusive remedies. 131
Copyright jurisprudence mirrors this doctrine, flatly denying that a collat-
eral antitrust defense can bar an action to enforce an infringement claim.132 The
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. For a review of the role antitrust violations have played in actions to enforce contracts see
Note, The Defense ofAntitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 758, 759-68 (1960);
Note, supra note 5, at 1291-93.
125. Compare Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 547 (1902) (plaintiff's contract
to sell pipe to the defendant unrelated to plaintiff's conspiracy to fix prices) with Continental Wall
Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 262 (1909) (enforcement of requirements
contract denied because it was part of a scheme to violate the antitrust laws).
126. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,
330 U.S. 743, 756-57 (1947).
127. 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
128. Id. at 744.
129. Id. at 744-45. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's practice of giving discounts to
volume buyers of cans exerted anticompetitive pressures against a small cannery like itself. Id. at
745. The Robinson-Patman Act outlaws price discrimination between purchasers "where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly... or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
130. Bruce's Juices, 330 U.S. at 755-56.
131. Id. at 750-51.
132. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, 719 F.
Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (denying antitrust defense to copyright infringement but recogniz-
ing misuse defense when there is an attempt to extend the limited monopoly beyond the protected
work); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publishing, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987); Orth-O-
Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Grant's Cabin, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633, 634-45 (E.D. Mo. 1979); United Artists Associated v.
NWL Corp., 198 F. Supp. 953, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (rejecting antitrust defense but denying plain-
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rationale behind this doctrine is twofold. First, the courts will not construe the
Sherman Act to divest a violator of his property rights, including ownership of a
valid copyright. 133 Second, the antitrust laws offer specific remedies that are
exclusive. 134 Both of these reasons are ones the Fourth Circuit expressly has
supported in the past,135 yet the Lasercomb court failed to address these points.
Lasercomb simply gives no indication whether the Fourth Circuit now questions
the continuing vitality of this precedent.
In the copyright-antitrust dynamic, a less clear-cut third choice has
emerged. In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 136 the Second Circuit
embroidered upon the collateral antitrust defense by providing that courts must
balance the competing policies of preventing copyright piracy and enforcing the
antitrust laws. 137 The district court in Alfred Bell had rejected the antitrust
defense as a matter of law, s38 recognizing that the Supreme Court's denial of the
collateral antitrust defense in Bruce's Juices had limited the misuse principles
outlined in Morton Salt.139 Although the Second Circuit affirmed, it chose in-
stead to take "into account the comparative innocence or guilt of the parties, the
moral character of their respective acts, the extent of the harm to the public
interest, [and] the penalty inflicted on the plaintiff if we deny it relief."' 140 Under
this balancing test, the Second Circuit found a clear copyright infringement, but
only a marginal antitrust violation, and therefore, held that the defendants "did
not establish the anti-trust 'unclean hands' defense."' 141 Subsequent courts, in-
cluding the Fourth Circuit, have agreed that balancing the equities is the proper
response to a copyright misuse defense.142
Against the backdrop of the last half-century of patent and copyright law,
tiff's motion to strike copyright misuse defense); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187
F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enters., 162 F. Supp. 129, 135
(E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir.
1959); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 480 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 2
F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
133. Pastime Amusement, 298 F. at 480 ("The Sherman Act does not make the party to an
interstate monopoly an outlaw.").
134. Id.
135. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Pastime Amusement without comment. M. Witmark & Sons
v. Pastime Amusement Co., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
136. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
137. Id. at 106.
138. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd,
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
139. Id. at 978.
140. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 106.
141. Id. at 105.
142. See F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("Dismissal of a copyright claim for misuse is an equitable defense which requires a
balancing of equities."); Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 143 F. Supp. 294, 298-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (employing Alfred Bell's balancing test; finding that the facts did not support an
antitrust defense). In Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 480 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954),
the defendant asserted a copyright misuse defense to plaintiff's action for infringement on the
grounds that it reproduced the copyrighted work of art for utilitarian purposes. The defendant
presented no unfair competition claims. The Fourth Circuit, citing Morton Salt, stated that it was
"not impressed" by the copyright misuse claim and observed that "the equities ... lie with the




the Lasercomb decision is significant because it marks the first time an appellate
court has used the copyright misuse defense to deny an infringement action. 143
Yet Lasercomb is far from surprising.144 Given the widespread acceptance of
Morton Salt's patent misuse doctrine, it seemed almost inevitable that an identi-
cal doctrine would appear in the law of copyright. Essentially the Lasercomb
court's analysis boils down to a syllogism: Patent and copyright law have paral-
lel constitutional goals of promoting progress. Under Morton Salt a patentee
who misuses his patent by exceeding the scope of the limited monopoly frus-
trates that policy goal and is unworthy of legal protection. Therefore, copyright
law must recognize copyright misuse as a defense to infringement. While this
reasoning has some appeal, it fails to distinguish critically between patent and
copyright theory and application, to comprehend the role copyrights play in
modem economics, or to provide any guideposts for what constitutes copyright
misuse.
By framing copyright policy as one designed to "promote progress," the
Fourth Circuit sidestepped two important points. First, although patents and
copyrights both offer limited monopolies to individuals primarily for the benefit
of the public, there are significant theoretical and practical differences between
them;145 these differences show that patents are more difficult than copyrights to
obtain, but offer more protection from infringement. 14 6 For example, because
patent infringers cannot interpose the defenses of independent creation or fair
use as can copyright infringers, a patent affords substantially greater economic
power than does a copyright.' 47 Thus, the danger to the public interest is
143. At the district court level, only two cases have used the misuse defense to bar the copyright
holder's claim: F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1136-37 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on grounds plaintiff misused its copy-
right), rev'd, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing copyright misuse defense
exists, but finding copyright holder did not violate the antitrust laws); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen,
80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger
Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
144. A substantial number of cases have considered the nature of copyright misuse; two of these
cases were from the Fourth Circuit. See supra notes 133-35 & 142 and accompanying texts. Inter-
estingly, the Lasercomb court cited only a single case, Jensen, that directly addressed the copyright
misuse defense. The opinion, however, did note repeatedly that this is an unsettled area of the law
and used such phrases as: "much uncertainty engulfs the 'misuse of copyright defense;"' "there is
little case law;" "the paucity of precedent;" and "uncertainty persists." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973-
76. Although the Lasercomb panel expressed these concerns partly due to the lack of a definitive
ruling from the Supreme Court, it is unclear whether these statements are the product of disingenu-
ousness or insufficient research. Also, instead of analyzing prior relevant cases, the court expended
its energy scrutinizing the monopoly practices of the British Crown during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. Id. at 974-75. Rather than reaching so far afield, perhaps if the court had analyzed
the case law that has developed over the past few decades, the court's opinion would have demon-
strated a firmer grasp of the nuances associated with the misuse doctrine.
145. For a comparison of patents and copyrights, see supra notes 1 & 6; Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100-04 (1951). Contra Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971)
(order denying certiorari) ("No distinction is made in the constitutional language between copy-
rights and patents and I would not create one by judicial gloss.") (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gibbs,
supra note 5, at 74-78 ("It should be concluded that there is no case for applying a distinction in the
availability of the misuse defense between patent infringement and copyright infringement cases.").
146. Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
147. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987). Although a patentee's economic power may be greater, that power is offset by the shorter life
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greater when a patentee seeks to enlarge his monopoly than when a copyright
holder acts similarly.
Second, the "promotion of progress" desired by the authorities is inextrica-
bly bound to an incentive-based scheme that rewards the grantee according to
the amount of copyrighted items sold or licensed.148 As a result of this royalty
scheme, owners of copyrighted works compete with one another to provide the
highest quality and most desirable works at a price the market is willing to pay.
The public policy in need of protection, therefore, is one that ensures that an-
ticompetitive practices do not impede or restrain the public's demand for copy-
righted works. 149
The Lasercomb decision presents three significant problems. Beyond con-
demning noncompete clauses in copyright licenses, it does not delineate the
boundaries of copyright misuse, because the Fourth Circuit opted to ground
misuse on an ill-defined public policy rather than on the antitrust laws. Further-
more, enforcement of a policy-based misuse doctrine announced in Lasercomb
necessarily depends on a morally culpable party. Finally, the opinion, which
states that antitrust-based misuse is acceptable, fails to grapple with the problem
of collateral antitrust defenses.
The Lasercomb panel never clearly articulated the public policy that in-
forms the copyright misuse defense. The court noted that society benefits from
"the efforts of authors to introduce new ideas and knowledge into the public
domain"'150 and that copyright law seeks "to increase the store of human knowl-
span of a patent compared to a copyright. See supra notes 1 & 6 for a comparison of patents and
copyrights.
148. The Supreme Court has observed that
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science
and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards com-
mensurate with the services rendered.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
149. See Note, supra note 5, at 1307-08. The Supreme Court has acknowledged repeatedly that
the copyright law's rewards to a grantee act as a mechanism to ensure that the public gains access to
new expressions: "'[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.'" Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 432 (1984) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) (em-
phasis added). In a similar vein, the patent grant also encourages competition:
When a new product appears on the market, it stimulates all concerned in the trade to
improve on it or to develop a competing product. After the Patent Office grants a patent
for the invention, the publication to the world of the specification adds to the fund of public
knowledge. The process continues ad infinitum. In this connection, it appears that a fun-
damental object of the Patent Laws is in effect to encourage the replacement of inferior
goods or processes by superior ones ....
WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 1, § 28:2. At the heart of both patent and antitrust doctrine is the
objective of maximizing consumer wealth by producing desirable goods at the lowest cost. There
may be a diversity of approaches on how to reach this goal, but patent and antitrust law are wedded
in a unitary purpose. W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTrIRuST LAW 1 (1973).
150. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975. A copyright does not protect ideas, only expressions. Ideas
are in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. For example, in
the literary world there are certain common ideas or themes that all are free to use, such as young
love tragically destroyed by fierce antagonisms between the families of the two lovers. This is an idea
as old as Shakespeare and is not copyrightable what is copyrightable are the expressions that convey
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edge and arts."''1 If that is true, then the goal of copyright policy should be to
encourage authors to meet the demand for such expressions and to remove ob-
stacles that interfere with that demand. Such obstacles then may appropriately
constitute misuse. Rather than explore this aspect of copyright policy, the court
repeated Morton Salt's command that "'[public policy] ... forbids the use of a
patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Pat-
ent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.' ",152 The circular
reasoning within that statement is apparent: Public policy forbids what is con-
trary to public policy. The only concrete idea in that tautology is the stricture
against expanding rights beyond what is conferred by the statute. Although
Lasercomb does not analyze why this expansion is against public policy, the
implication is that a copyright holder who extends his limited monopoly earns a
reward greater than what the statute contemplated. The courts, therefore, will
not protect one who receives an unearned property right because of the harm
done to the public interest.
In light of the Fourth Circuit's unwillingness to explore the contours of a
policy-based misuse defense, examining the sources on which the court relied is
instructive to better understand the policy the court invoked. One commentator
the court cited argues that the improper extension of the limited monopoly re-
quires a court to determine whether this conduct has anticompetitive effects,
because "the copyright law necessarily incorporated within it the public policy
of encouraging a competitive economy." 153  Misuse analysis, therefore, is de-
pendent on "an uncodified law of anticompetitive practices"' 54 rather than on
federal antitrust law. This same commentator, however, then argues that courts
"should be less interested in actual anticompetitive effects and more interested in
preserving the limits on monopoly grants"' 55 to prevent the copyright holder
from obtaining a reward greater than the copyright permits. This statement
suggests that the copyright grant is a safe harbor beyond which the grantee dare
not venture for fear of losing the court's protection. Such reasoning offers a
purist's view of the copyright grant as pristine and inviolable. The result is a
formalistic approach to the law. The copyright grant protects conduct it ex-
pressly authorizes, while other conduct may expose the grantee to infringements
that cannot be remedied because the court assumes that such conduct is an-
ticompetitive in a way harmful to the public interest.
Rather than make assumptions about the allegedly anticompetitive effects
generated by conduct outside the copyright grant, courts should look to the es-
tablished body of antitrust law for their misuse analysis. 15 6 Some commentators
the idea-the dialogue, unique plot twists, or clearly delineated characters. For an instructive essay
on the distinction between idea and expression, see Judge Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120-23 (2d Cir. 1930).
151. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
152. Id. (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)).
153. Gibbs, supra note 5, at 42.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 46-47.
156. See supra note 113 for a discussion of antitrust principles.
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argue that because copyright law predates antitrust law, the latter is unnecessary
to enforce the former. 157 Judge Posner has observed, however, that because the
misuse doctrine evolved before the antitrust laws, its current viability in judging
anticompetitive effects is questionable. Furthermore, he has argued that because
the antitrust laws affect all practices that could impair competition substantially,
establishing a separate doctrine with an identical purpose is difficult.158 Judge
Posner mused that courts would use such a doctrine to condemn "any... licens-
ing practice that is even trivially anticompetitive, at least if it has no socially
beneficial effects." 159
The Lasercomb opinion reflects the tendency for the misuse doctrine to as-
sume harmful anticompetitive effects. In examining the noncompete clause in
Lasercomb's licensing agreement, 16 the court asserted that the licensee is "re-
quired to forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its officers, directors and
employees in the area of CAD/CAM die-making software. Of yet greater con-
cern, these creative abilities are withdrawn from the public." 161 The withdrawal
of one company from the relevant market does not, however, guarantee that the
noncompete clause has harmful consequences; that would depend upon, among
other factors, the relative market strength the licensor already enjoyed. 162 In
Lasercomb's case, its Interact program did not dominate the marketplace, and
was actually one of seven competing systems available on the market. 163 Mar-
ket power, an essential element in antitrust analysis, is thus irrelevant to the
purist's view of copyright law, which the Lasercomb court followed. 164 The in-
consistency in this approach is striking. The Fourth Circuit seeks to condemn
misuse on economic grounds without analyzing its economic effects.
It is interesting to contrast Lasercomb's analysis with the economic inquiry
undertaken by Lasercomb's judicial ancestor, Jensen.165 In Jensen the court
found that the grantees' licensing methods allowed them to capture eighty per-
157. See, eg., Gibbs, supra note 5, at 36 ("Analysis of allegedly anticompetitive conduct from
the standpoint of copyright policy alone is absolutely proper, for federal copyright protection existed
for one hundred years before the Sherman Act became law.").
158. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
159. Id.
160. See supra note 19 for the language of the licensing agreement.
161. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
162. In this respect it may be helpful to analogize the noncompete clause to a merger between
competing companies. Both practices eliminate competition between firms that are, or could be,
rivals. The economic result, however, is not entirely clear-cut. If the two rivals have substantial
market shares, the result may well be monopoly and a restriction of output, with an attendant rise in
prices. If, in contrast, the rivals have insignificant market shares, their combination may either have
a neutral effect or result in economies of scale, improved management, or greater access to capital,
which in turn can produce a more "efficient" system, !e., one that produces goods that consumers
desire. See R. BORK, THE ANTrTRusT PARADoX 105, 219 (1978).
Analogizing between noncompete clauses and mergers, however, is fraught with imprecision.
In the merger situation, the market shares are a quantifiable amount; with the licensee who agrees
not to compete, it is pure speculation what the licensee's market share could have been had it not
agreed to the noncompete clause. For the procompetitive effects that may flow from noncompete or
exclusive dealing arrangements, see infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
163. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 13.
164. See supra note 73 for a definition of market power.
165. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom.
M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
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cent of the market for music integrated into motion picture soundtracks. 166
Although the Jensen court chose not to predicate copyright misuse on an anti-
trust violation, the court obviously was influenced by the scope of the grantees'
anticompetitive behavior. The Jensen court observed palpable effects flowing
from this conduct, noting that it effectually restrained competition 167 giving the
grantees the power to "sound the death knell of every motion picture theatre in
America."1 68 The court concluded that such power clearly extended beyond
what was granted under the copyright laws; the court therefore would not con-
done using one monopoly to obtain another.169
In contrast, in its Lasercomb opinion the Fourth Circuit could not detail
any tangible effects resulting from Lasercomb's licensing agreement. By the
time of trial Lasercomb had sold approximately forty licenses for Interact, but
the defendants could prove that only one Interact licensee was bound by the
standard licensing agreement that included the noncompete clause. 170 The
court was unimpressed with Lasercomb's assertion that the noncompete clause
was negotiable and had been modified on previous occasions. 17 1 Instead, the
court expressed concern that the noncompete clause was effective for ninety-nine
years, which could last longer than the life of the copyright. 172 But most impor-
tant to the Lasercomb panel was the similarity between the language of this
noncompete clause and the language found in a patent license that the Fourth
Circuit earlier had condemned as patent misuse. Misuse resulted from such a
condition because it" 'unreasonably lessen[ed] the competition which the public
has a right to expect.' "173 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not expound on
what would be a reasonable lessening of competition that would not constitute
misuse. Nor did the court document any actual anticompetitive effects. Instead,
the Fourth Circuit retreated to its purist's view of copyright law: for the
Lasercomb panel, a quantum of harm sufficient to injure the public interest
could be found in "Lasercomb's attempt to use its copyright in ... the Interact
software, to control competition in an area outside the copyright, Le., the idea of
computer-assisted die manufacture."' 174 While the Fourth Circuit asserted that
166. Id. at 847.
167. Id. at 849.
168. Id. at 847.
169. Id. at 850.
170. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 & n.8. For the language of the disputed noncompete clause, see
supra note 19.
171. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 n.8.
172. Id. at 978 & n.21. For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the copyright endures
"for the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
173. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (quoting Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc. 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added)). For a discussion of the judicial hostility towards noncompete clauses
in patent licenses, see infra note 175.
174. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added). Despite its professed allegiance to a pure,
nonantitrust misuse doctrine, the Fourth Circuit seems to be importing the antitrust concept of
attempted monopolization, which is forbidden under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Judi-
cial analysis of attempted monopolization claims involves three parts: (1) Inquiry into the relevant
market; (2) whether the defendant possessed a specific intent to achieve monopoly power, as opposed
to engaging in mere vigorous competition; (3) whether there is a "dangerous probability" that the
defendant, if left unchecked, would achieve an actual monopoly. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 6.05.
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restraints in competition injure the public, in the same breath the court found a
public injury even if a party only attempts to impair competition.175
Lasercomb's assumption of public harm also fails to consider that some
seemingly restrictive clauses actually have procompetitive consequences. 176 For
example, by conditioning a license on the licensee's agreement not to create com-
peting items, the licensor must compensate the licensee for the restriction.1 7 7
Such compensation lowers the price for the license, creating a cost savings that
the licensee can pass to the consumer. Although the licensee effectively takes
itself out of the particular market, the agreement should be enforceable unless it
demonstrably violates the Sherman Act's prohibition against contracts that re-
strain trade in a commercially unreasonable manner.178 The overall effect of
ignoring the well-established body of antitrust law and replacing it with a vague
Proof that the defendant already had a substantial market share may satisfy the "dangerous
probability" inquiry. Id.
By holding a grantee liable for attempts to control competition, the Fourth Circuit thus is trying
to have it both ways. It is holding grantees to a higher standard of commercial behavior than those
who do not possess a copyright, but without engaging in any serious economic analysis.
175. Although the Fourth Circuit did not scrutinize rigorously the nature of noncompete
clauses, given the precedents found in patent law, it likely assumed it did not have to. For nearly
fifty years the federal courts have consistently considered noncompete clauses in patent licenses to be
misuse per se. See Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th Cir. 1971); Berlenbach v.
Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1964); McCullough v. Kammerer
Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1948); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.,
137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1943); Park-In Theatres v. Paramount Richards Theatres, 90 F. Supp.
730, 734 (D. Del.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1950). One early case, relying in part on Morton
Salt, observed that "[a] patentee's right does not extend to the use of the patent to purge the market
of competing non-patented goods, except of course, through the process of fair competition." Na-
tional Lockwasher Co., 137 F.2d at 256.
Later courts adhered to this view, finding patent misuse when the patentee did not enforce the
noncompete clause, Berlenbach, 329 F.2d at 785, or despite arguments that the licensee had an
implied duty of good faith, under an exclusive license, to exploit the patent and refrain from using
competing nonpatented items. Park-In Theatres, 90 F. Supp. at 733-34. In Park-In Theatres the
patentee argued that the licensee who enjoyed the exclusive right to exploit the patent could choose
to use another nonpatented good, thereby depriving the patentee of any royalties, an act the patentee
considered to be in bad faith. Id. at 733.
Lasercomb advanced essentially the same argument in its brief, asserting that a licensee owes a
"duty of care not to undertake to create a new work to substitute for the licensed work, even though
a stranger to the agreement is entirely free to undertake to create a substitute work." Brief of Plain-
tiff-Appellee at 21. Such a view is supported by some courts and commentators. See Conan Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H
Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp. 816, 827-28 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 70, § 10.11[B]. Because Lasercomb provided certain codes that permitted a licensee to
convert Interact for the purpose of making the program compatible with the licensee's hardware,
Lasercomb argued that the noncompete license was essential to protect against a licensee misappro-
priating Interact. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 21. This vulnerability to misappropriation is proba-
bly what the district court referred to when it said that "'such a clause is reasonable in light of the
delicate and sensitive area of computer software.'" Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 (quoting the trial
court's findings). The Lasercomb panel, however, did not address this issue, finding the noncompete
clause to be misuse per se. Id. at 979.
176. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.).
177. Id. at 510.
178. See supra note 102 for the language of the statute. One commentator notes that per se
condemnation of noncompete or exclusive dealing arrangements is unwarranted due to certain
procompetitive effects that they may generate. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 21.03. Purchasers may
be benefitted, for example, by an assured supply, protection of the purchaser's capital investment,
and ease in long-term planning. Id.
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policy-based doctrine is to generate the debilitating uncertainty of which Judge
Posner warned.17 9
An antitrust-based misuse doctrine is not without problems. One comnen-
tator, in discussing patent misuse, notes that antitrust-based misuse creates two
possible results: Either the limited monopoly is allowed to extend beyond the
grant because there is no antitrust violation, or, if there is a violation, the grantee
is subject to the stem penalties of the antitrust laws, including treble damages
and attorney's fees.180 A policy-based misuse doctrine, therefore, affords an es-
cape valve from those penalties while it enforces the patent laws.' 8 ' In essence,
because policy-based misuse is available, "[tihe full weight of the antitrust laws
is not required" to enforce patent policy.' 8 2 This position, however, necessarily
depends on a belief that the patent and antitrust laws have distinct, if not antag-
onistic, policy goals-a belief that fails to withstand analysis.183
Another factor militating against antitrust-based misuse is the litigation ex-
penses an infringer must incur when seeking to prove the grantee was in re-
straint of trade. The result of these exorbitant expenses is that infringers may
not prosecute some antitrust actions against grantees in restraint of trade.' 8 4
This scenario is especially true in the case of an infringer asserting a collateral
antitrust defense. If the infringing defendant proves misuse because the grantee
violated the antitrust laws, the defendant escapes infringement liability; because
the defendant is not injured by reason of the antitrust violation, however, neither
treble damages nor attorney's fees will be available.18 5 Thus, there is less incen-
tive to litigate the question, 186 although ways are available to avoid this
dilemma.' 8 7
One of the more troubling aspects of a policy-based misuse doctrine is that
enforcement of the policy lies solely in the hands of a copyright infringer. If a
public policy is so important that it warrants depriving a property owner of the
court's protection against theft, why is a thief's conduct the only vehicle for
179. USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 512. Not only is there less certainty due to the nature of a policy-
based misuse, but copyright holders also wil have to speculate whether each practice condemned
under the patent misuse doctrine is equally vulnerable under copyright misuse. See supra notes 77-
83 and accompanying text for the types of conduct constituting patent misuse. If the Fourth Circuit
finds patent and copyright policy in virtual lockstep, may copyright holders now assume that courts
will engage in a market power inquiry in copyright cases involving tying arrangements and package
licensing, as is required only under the patent laws? See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988). Although prece-
dent exists for importing statutory requirements under the patent laws into copyright doctrine, see
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434-42 (1984), Lasercomb leaves copyright
owners with only a guess for whether this might be the case.
180. Calkins, supra note 4, at 187.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the patent and anti-
trust laws reflect parallel procompetitive policies.
184. Calkins, supra note 4, at 187.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
186. Note, supra note 5, at 1312 n.106.
187. One commentator suggests two possible solutions. One alternative is permitting the infring-
ing defendant to join the antitrust victim as a codefendant, thereby covering the litigation costs
should the antitrust counterclaim prevail. A second possibility is requiring that the government
intervene to enforce the antitrust laws, which places the litigation expenses on the government. Id.
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enforcing that policy? The pure copyright misuse theory holds that the public
interest is harmed by improper enlargement of the copyright, but such conduct
need not rise to the level of an antitrust violation. By varying the facts of
Lasercomb, one can imagine a situation in which no party has standing to en-
force this presumably important public policy.188 A public policy that relies so
heavily on happenstance and the willful wrongdoing of a private party to enforce
that policy is not much of a policy at all.189
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit did not attempt to address the issue
whether collateral antitrust violations can trigger the misuse defense. 190 The
court instead straddled the fence and found that misuse results from either anti-
trust or public policy violations. 19 1 Because the Fourth Circuit's holding was
grounded in a policy-based misuse, the court did not contemplate the validity of
prior Fourth Circuit caselaw that bars collateral antitrust defenses to copyright
infringement actions. 192 Had it affirmed this principle, while at the same time
deciding Lasercomb as it did, the court would have placed itself in an untenable
position. In both cases the infringing party would be in a position collateral to
the misuse, yet only the grantee who committed the more egregious offense-the
antitrust violator-would still be allowed to enforce an infringement claim.
A better approach would have been to disavow this precedent and distin-
guish collateral antitrust defenses in cases involving contracts and copyrights.
The former involve state-created rights while the latter involve rights created
188. Assuming the defendants had not broken the chronoguard and stolen the software for
themselves, they would not have been liable for infringement and would never have asserted the
copyright misuse defense; Lasercomb then would never have had the incentive to purge its misuse.
If a court found that the noncompete clause withstood an antitrust attack, the clause would remain
in force. At this point the only way to confine Lasercomb to its limited monopoly and discontinue
the anticompetitive conduct would be to use copyright misuse as an affirmative attack on the copy-
right holder. The Lasercomb panel did not need to contemplate this notion, but one court recently
rejected use of the copyright misuse doctrine as "a vehicle for affirmative relief." Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
A party may seek a declaratory judgment on the question of copyright misuse. See id. at 327;
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771 (SD.N.Y.
1975), rey'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Yet an affirmative judgment of misuse would permit a party to
infringe with impunity only until the copyright holder purged the misuse. The result here is the
same: enforcement of copyright policy is entirely dependent on one who willfully violates the copy-
right laws.
Judge Posner has also cast doubt on the importance of the policy that is meant to be protected.
In seeking to explain a patent misuse case arising out of the Fourth Circuit. Judge Posner suggested
that misuse doctrine, "unlike antitrust law, condemns any patent licensing practice that is even
trivially anticompetitive, at least if it has no socially beneficial effects." USM Corp. v. SPS Technol-
ogies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982). If so, one may wonder whether "De minimis non
curat lex"--"the law does not care for trifling matters"--holds true in the Fourth Circuit.
189. In denying an antitrust defense to a breach of contract action, Justice Brennan has observed
that "[i]f the defense of illegality is to be allowed as a collateral method of enforcement of the
antitrust laws,... it must be said that [this] creates a very strange class of private attorneys general."
Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959). Given the holding in Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit is in
effect expanding this "very strange class" for the purpose of enforcing an ill-defined public policy.
190. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
191. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
192. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470,480 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 2




under federal law. Any judicial repugnance towards injecting federal policy into
disputes governed by state law, therefore, is not warranted in actions already
concerning federal law.193 Furthermore, the rationale that courts should not
use the Sherman Act to divest a copyright holder of her property rights is un-
availing in light of the temporary effect that misuse doctrine has upon a copy-
right. Once the grantee purges her misuse she regains all rights to her property.
Moreover, while the remedies offered by the antitrust laws are said to be exclu-
sive, no rational basis exists for preventing federal courts from employing a well-
established body of legal analysis as a measuring device that is useful in enforc-
ing equally important federal laws. 194 The result in allowing collateral antitrust
violations to constitute misuse involves a trade-off. This choice requires infring-
ers asserting a misuse defense to satisfy the requirements of the antitrust laws. It
balances the burden of meeting this demand against permitting infringers who
have not suffered antitrust injuries to raise the misuse defense. This in turn
broadens the class of copyright holders who will be unable to pursue an infringe-
ment claim and should act as a deterrent to copyright abuse.
Although it is too early to gauge the impact of the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion, it hardly can be welcome news for copyright holders. 195 It remains an
open question, however, whether courts will construe Lasercomb narrowly or
will give it widespread application in infringement actions involving computer
software as well as in other fields. 196
193. But see Gibbs, supra note 5, at 70.
194. See Note, supra note 5, at 1314.
195. The Lasercomb decision already has attracted criticism outside the legal community. One
commentator in the computer software field suggests that the result in Lasercomb is "ridiculous,"
and the product of a judiciary that fails to comprehend that computer software is unique; software is
neither "like a book or a hammer," but an "entirely new beast." Gruenfeld, Copyrights: You Abuse,
You Lose, INFORMATION WEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at 52.
196. One recent software infringement action suggests that "shrink wrap" or "box top" licenses
may make the licensor vulnerable to charges of copyright misuse. Shrink wrap licenses are often
used in the marketing of consumer software. The license consists of a form attached to the exterior
of the software packaging, which alerts consumers that opening the package binds the consumer to
the terms of the license. 1 L. KurrEN, COMPUTER S6FrwARE, § 8.03[11 (1991). The form then
lists various provisions that seek to control the way the purchaser uses the software. Id.
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff copyright
holder brought an infringement action against another software producer, who purportedly was
bound by the terms of the plaintiff's shrink wrap license. In addition to the infringement action, the
plaintiff asserted a claim that the defendant breached its license agreement by decompiling or disas-
sembling the plaintiff's program in violation of a Louisiana statute. Id. at 258. That statute permit-
ted licensors to restrict licensees from decompiling or disassembling computer programs, as well as
enforcing a complete ban on copying the programs. Id. at 269. The Fifth Circuit found that such
restrictions conflict with the Copyright Act, which permits archival copies and copies made as an
essential step in the use of a computer program. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). The court then held
that the Copyright Act preempted the Louisiana statute, rendering the license agreement unenforce-
able. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270.
The potential application of Lasercomb's misuse doctrine is clear. When the copyright holder
seeks to usurp rights granted under the Copyright Act, this action ostensibly enlarges the grantee's
copyright beyond what was originally contemplated. If a court were to declare the grantee to have
misused the copyright in a case like Vault, the irony is remarkable: a grantee who has relied on a
state legislative expression of what the public policy should be concerning copyrighted programs
now has no remedy against those who infringe.
In areas outside computer software, Lasercomb's implications are less clear-cut. One could
imagine a film or video producer licensing the reproduction and distribution rights to another, on the
condition that the licensee agree not to enter into the business of film or video production. If the
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Despite the uncertain reach of the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Lasercomb
opinion is troubling in its flat rejection of the idea of defining copyright misuse
according to antitrust doctrine. The Fourth Circuit chose not to inquire into the
contested practice's actual effects. The result is that even though a licensing
agreement may be only marginally anticompetitive, have a neutral effect, or in
practice actually have procompetitive consequences, 197 it still will be harmful to
the public interest if it does not fall squarely within the defined bounds of the
statutory grant. This formalistic approach is out of step with modem economic
analysis and even traditional equitable principles of balancing one party's culpa-
bility against the other's. 198 Moreover, opting for a vaguely defined public pol-
icy rationale rather than antitrust principles likely will generate "debilitating
uncertainty" for copyright holders seeking to license their copyrights. 199
Although Lasercomb may be a landmark holding, its celebrity could well be
short-lived. Given the recent congressional attempt to subsume the patent mis-
use defense under antitrust principles, 2°° it may not be long before the Fourth
Circuit is legislatively preempted, at least far more quickly than the languid ju-
risprudential pace that transformed Morton Salt into Lasercomb.
ScoTT A. MISKIMON
licensee were to create an unauthorized derivative work (for example, a film sequel) in violation of
the noncompete clause, Lasercomb's misuse defense would bar any infringement action.
197. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text for the Second Circuit's balancing approach.
199. See supra note 179.
200. See supra note 76.
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